The Crisis in Syriza and the Prospects for the Radical Left in Greece

This article delves into the internal crisis of Greece’s SYRIZA party, analysing its electoral setbacks, leadership struggles, and fragmentation. It examines the broader implications for the radical left in Greece and explores the challenges of leftist politics in a context of conservative dominance and societal transformation.

The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) has, in numerous respects, emerged as one of the most significant initiatives of the modern radical left. The rapid ascent to power during the crisis (2012-2015), the capitulation with the European establishment in 2015, and the ensuing execution of an austerity program (2015-2019), alongside the contradictions of its strategy during its return to opposition (2019-2023), are events that merit examination regarding the potentialities and constraints of leftist (governmental) politics within a capitalist context. Additionally, the fragmentation of the party from the summer of 2023 to the present represents a notably unique evolution within European party systems overall. SYRIZA, undergoing a significant electoral decline in the dual elections of 2023 by forfeiting approximately 44% of its influence since 2019, encountered a profound leadership crisis following Alexis Tsipras’s departure in June 2023. This predicament escalated into an existential crisis for the party, leading to a further diminishment of its social influence and the fragmentation of its organised base due to successive internal crises and schisms. The primary inquiry that emerges is: Is the SYRIZA crisis indicative of a broader crisis within the European radical left, as evidenced electorally and in select national instances? Are there particular traits in the case of SYRIZA that are inherently linked to the ramifications of its incumbency experience?

The 2023 double elections were a significant setback for SYRIZA’s party elite, primarily because they refuted the rationale behind the emergence of a new two-party system in which the party would regain power within a normalised cycle of governing actors.

SYRIZA garnered 20.07% in the elections held on 21 May 2023 and 17.83% in the elections conducted on 25 June 2023. The voter count reverted to levels seen in May 2012, exhibiting significant declines in key constituencies, including prominent areas of Western Athens and Western Piraeus, as well as among public and private sector employees and the youth demographic[1]. The elections signified the ascendance of the conservative ND (New Democracy) as the dominant party in the party system and the notable revival of the social democratic PASOK-KINAL (Panhellenic Socialist Movement-Movement of Change), which had seen its standing usurped by SYRIZA since 2012[2]. Upon departing from leadership, Alexis Tsipras declared the conclusion of ‘a significant historical cycle’ for the party, initiating a process for the election of new leadership.

The leadership selection method was altered in April 2022 by the vote of the 3rd party congress. Prior to that time, the party leader was selected by the party congress; but, from 2010 forward, the leadership selection became non-competitive due to Tsipras’ unequivocal supremacy. In 2022, Tsipras proposed that SYRIZA implement a direct leadership selection process, according to the practices established by ND and PASOK-KINAL since 2009 and 2004, respectively. In the context of 2022, the primary objective of this selection process was to galvanise the party base for the forthcoming national elections; specifically, to engage sufficient members and supporters of SYRIZA through their involvement in the direct selection process to showcase Alexis Tsipras’ momentum in his political contest against ND’s leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis[3]. No requirements for candidacy for leadership were established (just party membership) and no criteria for participation in the selection process (anyone who paid a nominal fee on election day may participate). The central committee members were selected through direct voting by party members, albeit with a stipulated limit imposed[4]. Until 2023, the dominant perspective within SYRIZA was that Tsipras would remain the ‘perpetual’ leader of the party, with the sole internal debate centring on the inclusivity of the selectorate. Interestingly, following Tsipras’ exit, the criteria for participation in the process were not addressed, attributable in part to internal inertia and in part to the strategies of certain leadership aspirants. The modalities of the May 15th 2022 selection process were preserved for the new leadership contest, necessitating the prompt election of a leader prior to a congress that should have convened for a comprehensive evaluation of the electoral setback.

In July 2023, three internal factions were established within SYRIZA, from which the initial candidates were selected. The ‘Members’ Movement’, mostly including a majority of Tsipras-aligned cadres advocating for the party’s expansion towards the political centre, was split in its support between Efi Achtsioglou and Nikos Pappas. Nikos Pappas served as right-hand man to Alexis Tsipras, holding the position of minister of state and digital policy from 2015 to 2019, and was subsequently convicted of wrongdoing by a special court for ministers. Despite being a prominent figure in the ‘Members’ Movement’, he garnered support from only a segment of the faction. Efi Achtsioglou was a prominent MP and former minister of labour, associated with the centrist ‘6+6’ faction, established prior to the 3rd congress, primarily uniting the new generation of party officials. The endorsement of the direct election system at the 3rd congress was largely attributed to the coalition of the ‘Members’ Movement’ and the ‘6+6’ factions. Achtsioglou emerged as the most probable successor to Alexis Tsipras, receiving backing from Tsipras-aligned cadres. The ‘Umbrella’ faction united the party’s left wing, which opposed the direct election process in 2022 but chose to engage in 2023 with former finance minister Euclid Tsakalotos as a candidate. Achtsioglou was adopting a moderate strategy between Pappas and Tsakalotos, striving to present herself as the guarantor of SYRIZA’s governing potential.

This correlation of power was disrupted by the emergence of Stefanos Kasselakis on 29 August 2023 as a candiadate, a businessman from the USA unfamiliar with Greek politics. This individual had no prior established affiliation with SYRIZA or the left in Greece, yet became engaged in Greek politics in early 2023 by joining SYRIZA’s transparency sector and was subsequently nominated as a candidate on the party’s 2023 state ticket.

Kasselakis, lacking a defined platform and endorsement from SYRIZA’s party elite, yet demonstrating vigorous social media engagement and extensive local campaigning, succeeded in securing victory in the first round of the elections on September 17, 2023.

Subsequently, with the backing of the party’s pro-Tsipras faction, he attained leadership in the second round on September 24, 2024[5]. This was a unique occurrence, as a wholly unfamiliar politician gained the trust of the majority of the SYRIZA selectorate over more prominent and recognisable candidates. It served as a catalyst for the party’s disintegration tendencies. Kasselakis should not be regarded as the main cause for the party’s crisis, as the factors contributing to this crisis had already begun to emerge before to 2023; rather, he is a manifestation of the decline experienced by the formerly dominant radical left party.

The result of the election can be explained by the composition of SYRIZA’s base. For the most part, the party’s enlarged base, which had begun to form from 2012 onwards, consisted of former PASOK voters. The majority of these voters, who were not related to the radical left base of the old SYRIZA, were aligned with SYRIZA through the personal appeal of Tsipras. A mutual suspicion existed between the radical left of the party elite and this mass of former PASOK voters. The former believed that the latter threatened the party with a mutation of fundamental features of its ideological identity, while the latter believed that the former did not want them in their party but merely tolerated them as necessary voters. This dynamic is evidenced by the outcome of the leadership selection process, wherein Kasselakis garnered a substantial percentage of the votes in the first round, despite having the support of only four SYRIZA MPs and a single central party official. In the second round, a significant segment of the former pro-Tsipras party bureaucracy, which was closely aligned with Nikos Pappas, underwent a shift in allegiance, supporting Kasselakis, thereby ensuring his eventual victory. This development, while indicative of a shift in the internal dynamics of the party, also provides valuable insights into the relationship between SYRIZA and its grassroots supporters.

Following Kasselakis’ selection, internal developments within SYRIZA recurred: after the central committee meeting in November 12, 2023, members of the ‘Umbrella’ and ‘6+6’ factions opted to depart from SYRIZA, initially establishing a separate parliamentary group comprising eleven former SYRIZA MPs, subsequently forming a new political entity named the ‘New Left’. During the 4th SYRIZA congress in February 22-25, 2024, another internal challenge to Kasselakis’ leadership arose, primarily from associates of Alexis Tsipras, which did not immediately precipitate a new intra-party leadership contest. In the 2024 European elections, SYRIZA’s electoral support diminished to 14.8%, prompting renewed internal dissent against Kasselakis and resulting in a motion for impeachment within the central committee (September 8, 2024). This culminated in the president’s removal and subsequently barred Kasselakis from future candidatures for party leadership (October 30, 2024). In approximately ten days, the SYRIZA parliamentary group lost seven additional MPs, leading to its removal from the opposition position in favour of the PASOK-KINAL parliamentary group. On November 23, Kasselakis announced the establishment of a new party named ‘Movement for Democracy’. In the forthcoming leadership selection to be held on 24 November 2024, Socratis Famellos was selected as party leader over Pavlos Polakis, with a participation rate of approximately 70,000 members. Beginning in July 2024, SYRIZA is consistently reported in all polls with a share below 10%, indicating a clear loss of its status as an alternative to New Democracy.

Kasselakis employed ideological eclecticism to build his political discourse during his brief tenure as president of SYRIZA. This indicated the amalgamation of allusions from social democratic, liberal, and conservative traditions at various levels, revealing a failure to establish an ideological centre of gravity. It was evident that he lacked a comprehensive understanding of left-wing ideology, only identifying himself by his opposition to Kyriakos Mitsotakis, without necessarily adopting an anti-right-wing political stance. Simultaneously, the most telling aspect of his vision was his aspiration to structurally transform SYRIZA into a party that would enable the leader’s direct connection with the party’s grassroots. Consequently, he placed greater emphasis on referendum-style appeals to party members and supporters than on internal collective processes. Kasselakis was mostly incapable of establishing a modus vivendi among the factions of Syriza, a need for a fragmented party, which significantly contributed to its downfall. Conversely, despite SYRIZA’s already unfavourable public image, which is the result of incessant internal disputes, the share of votes in the 2024 European elections was commendable. This was indicative of a collective aspiration among the SYRIZA constituency in favour of the party’s survival. Throughout the SYRIZA crisis, the social base dimension was not considered at any point during the serial exits by the participating actors in their decision-making processes. The internal debate was insular and self-referential, occurring mostly among the party elite and middle-level elites, without reflecting any societal antagonisms.

The origins of the crisis in SYRIZA, as previously noted, are evident in the years preceding 2023. The party became presidentialised and personalised during Tsipras’s leadership, signifying his complete dominance in candidate selection and in the formulation of the party’s discourse, and the diminished collective operation of SYRIZA. The post-2019 decision for party appeals to gravitate towards the political centre and middle class, the incorporation of individuals unaffiliated with the party and lacking leftist political commitments into party lists, and the reluctance of party personnel to obstruct these decisions significantly contributed to SYRIZA’s decline. Aside from a central committee document in 2020, there was never a structured debate or assessment of the 2015-2019 governmental performance within the party, which exacerbated feelings of scepticism among numerous voters against SYRIZA. This constituted the foundation of the crisis that was fundamentally instigated following Alexis Tsipras’ exit, which ultimately revealed, on one hand, the inadequate institutionalisation of the party from 2012 onwards, and, on the other hand, the detrimental consequences of cartelisation from 2015 onwards.

Currently, the original SYRIZA, established in the summer of 2013, has fractured into six distinct parties. The present SYRIZA, led by Socratis Famellos, is endeavouring to enhance its public image following a prolonged period of internal strife.

However, it is presently experiencing low voter intention rates (5-8%) and has forfeited its status as the main opposition, which carries significant symbolic weight. It continues to attract the highest number of voters compared to other parties originating from the original SYRIZA; nonetheless, this figure is insufficient to initiate a process of reunification inside the original SYRIZA constituency. The New Left, which became a political party in March 2024, did not secure an MEP in 2024 and is now polling below 3% in voter intention. Following Kasselakis’s removal from SYRIZA, the primary impetus for the exodus of the New Left cadres has dissipated, presenting them with the difficulty of establishing a unique identity to secure their political viability. Currently, it persists through its parliamentary group and the moderate prominence it holds in the media. Both parties must address the trust deficit that SYRIZA inherited before to 2023, which was associated with its governance experience. The ‘Course of Freedom’ party, led by Zoe Konstantopoulou—President of the Greek Parliament in 2015—has solidified its position within parliament by cultivating an anti-corruption, sovereignist rhetoric that transcends the traditional Left-Right dichotomy. The ‘Movement for Democracy’ of Stefanos Kasselakis is fundamentally rooted in the attributes he sought to further within SYRIZA, emphasising the ‘anti-democratic’ manner of his expulsion from the party. Ultimately, Yanis Varoufakis’s MeRA25 (European Realistic Disobedience Front) and the ‘LAE-Unbound Left’ (Popular Unity-Unbound Left), collaborating in a political coalition, represent two parties distinctly positioned on the radical left, primarily referencing the summer of 2015 and their opposition to the SYRIZA government’s acceptance of the third bailout program. ‘Course for Freedom’, ‘Movement for Democracy’, and MeRA25 ground their existence in a narrative of political ‘consistency’ aimed at addressing the trust gap encountered by SYRIZA and the New Left.

The opposition on the left side of the political spectrum is fragmented, which sustains New Democracy’s advantage despite its significant decline in votes during the 2024 European elections. The constrained rebound of PASOK and the crises SYRIZA is facing hinder the establishment of a credible alternative to conservative domination. In this backdrop, the far-right forces in Greece, currently represented by three parties (‘Hellenic Solution’, ‘Niki’, ‘Voice of Logic’), appear to be gaining momentum. During the period of the financial crisis, SYRIZA successfully positioned itself as a democratic alternative, primarily by supplanting a deteriorating and untrustworthy social democratic party in the party system as a more credible actor from the radical left. The sluggish recovery of PASOK—an otherwise detrimental development—largely negates this achievement, addressing the question of the alternative. This is due to its programmatic proximity to the centre, with its party base also exhibiting a negative bias against radical left parties. At this juncture, a progressive resolution via PASOK is unattainable; thus, only a radical leftist option constitutes a viable alternative. The current fragmentation among the left obstructs this vision, since all the parties reminiscent of the former SYRIZA are imbued with mutual suspicion and animosity.

In this backdrop, it is evident that the radical left in Greece is undergoing a transformation as it seeks to navigate the repercussions of 2015-2019. The crises and fragmentation of SYRIZA illustrate the constraints of this party in an age characterised by polycrisis and conservative hegemony.

A specific sector of Greek society remains linked with core leftist principles. Currently, we cannot refer to a crisis of leftist ideologies in Greece, but rather to a crisis of leftist political parties and their representatives. The conditions do not appear conducive to the essential reconstitution of this political space; nonetheless, neglecting this reconstitution would yield long-term repercussions for both the future of the Greek left and the future of democracy in the country.

References/Remarks:

[1] Panayiotis Koustenis (2023), ‘The dual elections of 2023: Breakthroughs, twists and reversals’, Modern Issues, 160-161, pp. 54-62 [in Greek].
[2] Yannis Tsirbas (2023). ‘Towards a predominant party system: the May 2023 election in Greece’. South European Society and Politics, 28(2), pp. 207–230.
[3] The selection process was conducted on 15 May 2022, with approximately 151,000 members of SYRIZA participating, of whom 110,000 were new registrants. The subsequent day, the total number of party members stood at 172,000, indicating that approximately 20,000 of the older members, constituting one third of the total, did not partake in the process.
[4] Only those who had registered as members of the party by March 21, 2022.
[5] In the initial round of the selection process, approximately 150,000 members participated, while in the subsequent round, this figure decreased to 130,000. In the initial round, Kasselakis garnered 45% of the votes, while Achtsioglou received 36%. In the subsequent round, the respective percentages were 56% and 44%.

Cover image: Press conference of Alexis Tsipras at the TIF. Source: Joanna via flickr.com.